Bakhmut Holds … ish
Also on Tuesday evening, the Ukrainian Telegram channel DeepState brought bad news from Bakhmut. After having been pushed back two days earlier, Russian forces reportedly launched simultaneous diversionary attacks at the north and south of the city. While that was underway, a force that included both Wagner and airborne VDV forces pushed in from the east and took the railroad station and much of the surrounding blocks.
I’ve expanded the area this morning expressly to show how far things have slid from the days when Russia was endlessly trying to take the winery, or the drywall factory, and making their HQ at the landfill back along Patrisa Lumumby Street. At this point, Russia controls somewhere between 70% and 80% of the area within the limits of Bakhmut.
There are still a lot of Ukrainian forces within the city, but they’re now confined to that small area in the west, while Russia has increasingly moved artillery in from three sides, concentrating fire on Ukraine’s remaining force. This is a bad situation, and despite the occasional pushback or slowdown, it has been getting progressively worse since Soledar was occupied by Russia in January. How much longer Ukraine can keep a toehold in Bakhmut is extremely unclear.
As for why Ukrainian forces remain in this area in spite of absolutely hellish conditions, Deputy Minister of Defence Hanna Maliar spoke on Ukrainian television Tuesday night. “It is in Bakhmut where the enemy is concentrating their main efforts, so we have to concentrate there in response in order to stop them,” said Maliar. “In fact, Bakhmut has now taken the main blow of the enemy’s armed forces and their private armies in the East.”
There is no doubt that Russia has lost tens of thousands of men in their attempt to capture Bakhmut. No doubt that the fields and roads around the city are filled with the burnt out shells of Russian tanks, transports, and artillery. It’s impossible to know what the cost has been to Ukraine to defend the city. The daily list of obituaries that end with “killed in Bakhmut” shows that the cost is very high. Squads that had been made famous by their success in Kharkiv or their bravery at Severodonetsk, have evaporated in the heat of Bakhmut.
In an interview earlier this week, Ukrainian Defence Minister Oleksii Reznikov spelled out why Russia is wiling to lose so many men and so much equipment if it means making even the smallest gain.
According to Reznikov Russia doesn’t care if they lose 1 million soldiers. Or 2 million. Or three. There are 20 million men of potential military age in Russia. Russia is willing to give up a significant fraction of them if it means capturing all, or even half of Ukraine. After all, should Russia actually capture the areas of Ukraine it has already officially claimed to own, that’s another 20 million people and some impressive resources.
Spend 1 million men to subjugate 20 million? For Russia, that’s attractive math. As for Bakhmut …
“Their ‘creeping’ attack there is going on for the sixth or even seventh month. They use assault waves, attack tactics. There may be ten or twelve such waves that directly follow each other. In Bakhmut alone, because of this, they lose up to 500 killed and wounded soldiers per day. But there, first of all, there are Wagner Group soldiers, criminals and convicts, whom they simply discard in great numbers.”
Russia has spent tens of thousands of soldiers trying to capture Bakhmut. But the question is … does Russia care?
As the Associated Press reports, Russia has just passed a bill that allows the military to send mobilization notices by email or text message. This is widely seen as an indicator that Russia intends to drag another round of mobilized troops to Ukraine, likely replicating past events by throwing many of them onto the front lines untrained and poorly supplied.
How is all this affecting Russia? Here’s what The Moscow Times has to say about an odd shortage of young workers that is affecting Russian productivity.
The number of young workers in Russia fell by 1.33 million people between December 2021 and December 2022.
Where did they go? Many fled Russia when the mobilization was announced. Some shifted to jobs in the “gray economy” when inflation and the declining value of the ruble made ordinary jobs unattractive. Others are dead in the mud across Ukraine.
Not to worry. Russia is finding someone to fill the open positions. Unlike France, where discussions of raising the retirement age have resulted in protests across the nation, Russia reformed pensions just five years ago, reducing the pay of retirees and sharply increasing the time most people have to stay on the job. So jobs that would be going to young people at the start of their careers are now being filled by older Russians who aren’t able to retire.
Russians aged 60-69 showed the biggest increase in workforce share from December 2021-December 2022 at 336,000 people.
With an average life expectancy of 71, it’s not all that clear how many older Russians are available to fill the gap left by the missing young. But hey, Russia can always just kidnap 1 million young Ukrainians. Considering the thousands of people stolen away from Mariupol, and the estimate of child abductions that run as high as 300,000 taken from across Ukraine, they already have a good start.
People. As far as Russia has concerned, they are a fungible commodity.
The bigger question for Russia may not ultimately be whether or not it can really keep up the number of people “creeping” forward in wave attacks. Right now, more than half of Russia’s total active tank force is dead on the field, and it is not even close to manufacturing new ones at a rate that replaces its losses. Declining rates of artillery fire are a good indication that Russia has blown through decades of stockpiles and has started to operate at a level closer to the number of shells it can actually kick out each month.
In total over 10,000 vehicles and pieces of heavy equipment have been lost to Russia since Vladimir Putin launched his illegal and unprovoked invasion. Grotesque as it sounds, it may be those losses and not the number of dead—which Ukraine this morning estimated at over 180,000—that ultimately forces Russia to stop.
Russia completes defensive lines around Melitopol
It’s also that equipment loss that is likely to make the Russian front lines vulnerable to a Ukrainian counteroffensive once Ukraine assembles the force, and ammunition, necessary to conduct a sustained advance. And Russia may understand that just as well as anyone else.
When Russian forces began making bits of disconnected trench in a seemingly unimportant area of Donetsk shortly after the Ukrainian counteroffensive in Kharkiv, it was easy to make fun of the “Putinot Line.” The unanchored “dragon’s teeth” looked as if they wouldn’t stop a tractor, much less a tank. The short segment of trench didn’t seem to be defending anywhere in particular. The whole thing was far from the front line that it seemed not just unimportant, but an utter waste of time and effort.
However, over the intervening months, trenches have become ever more important to defending positions on the front line in Ukraine. Sure, the area in between the lines can still be crossed by tanks and other armor, but when the soldiers in the trenches are carrying anti-tank weapons, that crossing can be almost as hazardous as infantry rushing a machine gun nest. And if there is one piece of equipment that Russia makes that’s actually the envy of militaries around the world, it is this:
Using machines like this one, Russia has now completed hundreds of kilometers of trenches, all along the front line and in some areas, many miles from the front. That includes a reported 120 kilometers of trenches around Melitopol where Russia—like apparently every analyst with access to a keyboard—expects Ukraine to launch its counteroffensive in the next few weeks.
Will these trenches actually make up for a shortfall in Russian arms and ammunition? Not completely, and it’s difficult to say just how effective they will be. After all, Ukraine has had some pretty elaborate defensive works in place at locations like Klishchiivka, south of Bakhmut, and Russia managed to overrun then within a day while not being exactly masters of combined arms.
Russia’s defensive lines (which we’ll look at in detail later this week) might be the tonic they need to accommodate their shrinking (and aging) tank force and declaiming levels of artillery support. Or they might be a literal speed bump on Ukraine’s way to the coast. We don’t know … yet.
France reportedly blocking Ukraine’s ammunition
The one thing that’s obvious to all observers, and which was featured in those supposed top secret documents back in February, is that Ukraine needs more ammo. More small arms ammo, more artillery shells, more tank shells, more MLRS rockets, more ammo.
In addition to the pledges already made by the U.S., U.K., Poland, and others to ship large batches of additional ammo to Ukraine, there is currently a deal on the table to supply Ukraine with more a more constant supply. In an agreement announced on March 20, that deal should provide Ukraine with 1 million 155 mm artillery shells a year.
However, there are reports this morning from Polish media, that France … is blocking the deal.
The issue seems to be about how the ammo—which is produced primarily in Germany, France, and Poland—is to be reimbursed, with supplies coming from nations outside the EU to replace any depleted stocks and Ukraine paying for ammunition on an as-needed basis. France reportedly has issues both with the sources of ammo (they’d like replacement shells to be manufactured within the EU) and with how Ukraine is paying (they want it structured differently).
In the opinion of some diplomats, lobbying by defence companies may be behind France’s decision.
Yeah. That’s just great. I will now resist any remarks about the French and wars.
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