Most of the documents are no longer available publicly, as the Discord channels have been wiped. Some of the documents, including several doctored ones, continue to circulate on Twitter and Facebook. This thread, quoting from stories from The New York Times and Yahoo News, summarizes some of the key discoveries. This Washington Post article summarizes it succinctly:Â
The series of detailed briefings and summaries open a rare window on the inner workings of American espionage. Among other secrets, they appear to reveal where the CIA has recruited human agents privy to the closed-door conversations of world leaders; eavesdropping that shows a Russian mercenary outfit tried to acquire weapons from a NATO ally to use against Ukraine; and what kinds of satellite imagery the United States uses to track Russian forces, including an advanced technology that appears barely, if ever, to have been publicly identified.
One top secret document, allegedly from the CIA, claims that Hungarian President Viktor Orban, a constant thorn on both NATO and the EUâs side as he descends into authoritarianism, considers the US to be âone of its most significant geopolitical adversaries.â Whatâs interesting isnât that revelation. Anyone paying attention could surmise that. Itâs the confirmation that American intelligence seemingly sought and found concrete evidence of this is what is damaging.
Same as slides claiming insight into the thinking and decisions of Israeli intelligence, South Koreaâs executive branch, and even Ukraineâs military leadership. Everyone wants to keep up the fiction that no one spies on their allies. The revelation that they do isnât unexpected or surprising, itâs just really freakinâ uncomfortable. Discretion is expected among friends.
One slide I have seen, and studied closely, is the supposed composition of nine brand new brigades to be used for the spring offensive, six of them supposedly ready March 31, and the last three by April 30. In addition to giving a more approximate date for the earliest the spring offensive might start (in three weeks), itâs not helpful for the enemy to know exactly what vehicles, and how many of them, any particular unit might have. Â
On the other hand, itâs clear that the U.S. intelligence capabilities can be put to good use. For example, one slide details specific targets that the Russian Defense Ministry had picked in Odesa and Mykolaiv on a specific date (March 3). One of those targets was a Ukrainian drone factory. After early March drone attacks in those cities, Russia claimed to have destroyed a drone factory. One hopes that Ukraine got this intelligence and cleared out the location of that factory ahead of the strikes. It would be hilarious if Russia wasted critically short missiles or drones thinking they destroyed key Ukrainian military infrastructure, if all they hit was an empty warehouse.Â
Should we be surprised? We knew prior to the war that the U.S. knew exactly where and when Russia would invade. It had precise information of the moment that ground commanders received the order to attack. Weâve joked over the past year that Putin had good reason to be paranoid, given how the U.S. seemed to have eyes and ears on his decisions. Now we know that insight extends from massive âRussia is about to invadeâ information, to the relatively trivial âthese are the exact targets Russia will hit tomorrow.âÂ
One document notes that China might be more inclined to supply Russia with critically needed ammunition if Ukraine “hit a [Russian] location of high strategic value” or targeted âsenior Russian leaders.â It is true that the U.S. doesnât have many long-range ATACMS rocket artillery missiles, which Ukraine desperately wants. But American intelligence seems to be saying âsend these rockets and one of them hits the wrong target inside Russia, then China single-handedly solves Russiaâs ammunition challenges overnight.â
Suddenly, American reticence makes a lot more sense. Heck, even if Ukraine used the rockets sensibly, Russia could be incentivized to stage a false-flag attack to draw Chinese help. At the very least, it dramatically complicates the decision. Critics say that itâs stupid that Joe Biden doesnât want to escalate the situation; âhow much more can Russia escalate?â they ask. But given this slide, itâs not Russia theyâre worried about. Ukraineâs chances of winning are far higher if Russia canât replace the ammunition itâs consuming.Â
The author of the thread above notes that âThese US slides are absolutely full of detail on sources & methods on issues well beyond Russia/Ukraine. The phrase âaccording to a signals intelligence reportâ comes up frequently. There are details on technical means of collection. This is a very damaging leak.â Again, I havenât read the original documents, and the ones I did see didnât speak to methods collecting, but âaccording to signal intelligence reportâ doesnât really say much.
Everyone knows the NSA exists, and that the U.S. has unprecedented ability to hoover up and analyze anything transmitted over the air or online. Confirmation of that ability doesnât seem particularly damaging. Same with satellite surveillance. The Washington Post story above notes that âthe Feb. 23 battlefield document names one of its sources as âLAPIS time-series video.â Officials familiar with the technology described it as an advanced satellite system that allows for better imaging of objects on the ground and that could now be more susceptible to Russian jamming or interference.â How could Russia jam imaging technology, which by this description, would just mean better cameras? And sure, those âofficials familiar with the technologyâ might be fudging details or even the true capabilities of that system to throw Russia off the scent, but presumably Russia already knows our satellites have eyes on the ground, and are helpless to do much about it.
Documents estimating personnel and equipment losses were doctored and posted on Russian Telegram, but the originals point to a brutally decimated Russian military. According to Oryxâs open source count of visually destroyed Russian military equipment in Ukraine, Russia has lost 1,928 tanks, 1,168 of them destroyed. One of the leaked documents claimed that Russia had, at the time of the leak (around March 1), lost 2,048 destroyed. Maybe they meant âlost,â which would better line up with Oryxâs numbers, as those includes damaged, abandoned, and captured tanks as well. More interestingly, the document claimed that Russiaâs remaining supply of tanks was severely depletedâwith only 419 tanks left in Ukraine, and just another 561 tanks in reserves (which would explain why 1950âs era tanks are being pulled from storage.)
Another document provides American intelligence estimates of Russian and Ukrainian losses, the slide crudely doctored by the Russian side. The âlow confidenceâ estimate of Russian losses is 35,500-43,000 dead and 154,000-180,000 wounded. For Ukraine, the numbers are 15,500-17,500 dead and 109,500-113,500 wounded. The wounded-to-dead ratio would confirm what we can plainly seeâthat Ukraine has far better medical evacuation and care for its wounded than the Russians, who we often see callously leave their wounded lying in fields. Still, the slide makes clear that the estimates are rough, even if these lower numbers make more sense than some of the other numbers floating around, such as Ukraineâs claims that theyâve killed 178,150 Russians as of today. But you add up the Russian dead and wounded, many of which are out of the war for good, and that 178,150 number as one that includes total casualties starts making more sense.Â
Not that it matters, in a practical sense. This war wonât be won or lost based on who killed the most, but on equipment, strategy, and morale. Both sides have enough people to compel to the fight if necessary. It does them no good if they canât equip them, or if thereâs no will to fight. And this is why the ability of the West to supply Ukraine (and conversely, keeping China out of the fight) is so critical.Â
This is where Bakhmut has been so important to Ukraineâs overall strategy. We know that over a thousand pieces of Western armor (and what seems to be Polandâs remaining stock of Soviet-era gear) are currently in Ukraine or en route. We know Ukrainian forces are being trained in combined arms maneuvers by the U.S. in Germany. We know that HIMARS rocket artillery has been working Russian logistics around Melitopol and other parts of Russian-occupied southeastern Ukraine.Â
Meanwhile, Russiaâs vaunted Winter Offensive never truly materialized in any coherent sense. Rather than an intentional massed offensive designed to break Ukrainian defenses in the Donbas, thus meeting Putinâs goal of conquering both Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts by March 1, we got wave after wave of 6-10-man squads dying for the next meter of land. After eight months of trying, Russia still hasnât even been able to conquer the otherwise strategically insignificant Bakhmutâonly the 59th largest city in Ukraine.Â
The cost to defend Bakhmut in lives has been horrific, and military historians will long debate whether its defense was worth the cost. Could Ukraine have retreated to more advantageous high ground immediately to its west, lessening losses? At this point itâs academicâUkraine made its decision. While it sucks for raw recruits dying and losing limbs in its defense, it has bought Ukraine the time it needs for the coming spring offensive. And boy is Ukraine taunting Russia about it.Â
What does Russia have in reserve? Nothing. It has now extended prisoner contracts from six months to 18, almost guaranteeing their death or dismemberment. It wants to recruit 400,000 new contract soldiers, but will be lucky to hit its targets in its spring conscription, much less get people to voluntarily sign up to go to Ukraine. And its sanction-crippled industry canât supply the equipment its current troops need, much less equip hundreds of thousands of new troops if Russia manages to find them.Â
I know the chart is hard to read, but on March 1, Russia launched 170 attacks against Ukrainian positions, and that has steadily decreased to only 40 on April 7. On April 8 the number was 50, and todayâs report is back down to 40, thus the downward long-term trend continues. And most of those attacks are around Bakhmut, where the situation remains critical but contained, with the lone muddy dirt road into town still (mostly) open (because regular Russian army forces holding the flanks around Bakhmut either canât, or donât want to, cut it off).Â
#SpringIsComing might be the harbinger of something big, or it might be psyops to psych out the enemy. Who knows! Well, given the intelligence leak, I bet Joe Biden knows, and apparently way too many people with top-secret designation who had access to those documents.Â
Looks like theyâre building underground living facilities.
The leaked documents claim that Ukraine has fired 9,612 GMLRS rounds. Given that Ukraine has had HIMARS in country for nine months now, that averages out to only around 35 per day. With people demanding more tanks, howitzers, and HIMARS launchers for Ukraine, I keep coming back to thisâthe challenge isnât the weapons systems. Those are easy to deliver and relatively cheap. Itâs the ammunition thatâs the problem, and spare parts, and fuel, and lubricant, etc.
As Iâve written about before, the army had only produced 50,000 GMLRS total at the end of 2022, including deliveries to other weapons system operators (which I roughly count at 18 countries). Ukraine has received 20% of that amount, which is significant, but the actual numbers are still anemic. New production takes timeâonly 566 can be produced per month. And efforts to double that production won’t be fully in place until 2026.
Yes, this is incredibly frustrating. No, this doesnât mean that the U.S. isnât giving Ukraine the tools it needs to win, and no, there isnât a simple solution. If anything, perhaps weâre learning that of the hundreds of billions the Pentagon spends on shiny new weapons systems, perhaps they need to spend some of that on stockpiling ammunition for the stuff they already have.Â